Relevance of Earlier Warfare to Modern Warfare Essay

The art of War has been the subject of great scholarly activity as the attributes that make a person a skilled Commander in times of War have arose great curiosity amongst statesmen, generals and philosophers alike. More surprisingly, the advent of modern warfare has cast a shadow of fallacy on the minds of many individuals and has made them to believe that the current military professional has nothing to learn from the great commanders of the past as he is too â€Å"well equipped† to dwell on such detail. The truth is that history is the best teacher and as this paper progresses, I will be utilizing historic references to explain my point of contention that there is still a lot to learn from the likes of Fredrick the Great, Napoleon and Ulysses Grant. Argument The first and foremost evidence to support my thesis is that there is similarity between the goals of the current military professional and his counterpart from centuries ago. This similarity is more profound if you find yourself fighting for the same ideals, the same land and the same enemy. It is this similarity between the two that allows the current military professional to reassess himself in light of what is happening today. For example, according to Adam Hart – Davis (2007), the prime reason for the fall of Napoleon was that he invaded Russia, in the year 1812 (P. 179). The Russian Generals tactfully withdrew from territory destroying their own towns, farms, cultivation and infrastructure along the way. A month after defeating the Russians outside Moscow, Napoleon decided to retreat back to Paris out of concern of loss of control. However, his decision to do so in the winter proved fatal as the lack of shelter and infrastructure killed his troops physically and mentally. The Russians kept pursuit of the retreating forces and managed to kill scores of them. By the time Napoleon managed to get back home, all that was left of his army was a demoralized handful of men against an efficiently trained numerous force that had left Paris with him on the way to Russia earlier that year, contributing to his eventual fall in 1815. According to Gilbert (2004), a 130 years on, Hitler made the same mistake when he invaded Russia in 1941 just when the harsh winter started (P. 249). The Russians employed the same strategy and after defeating the Germans at the siege of Moscow and Stalingrad, they chased the retreating German forces back into Germany proper and were instrumental in the fall of Berlin and the end of the Nazi regime itself. Thus, had Hitler paid attention to the fault at which his predecessor had been, there was a great probability that he would not have met the end that he did in 1945. The second point of argument is that although how we conduct warfare these days has changed, the strategy or tactfulness has not. No matter what resources in weaponry and personnel that a general may have at his disposal, there is no denying that as far as tact is concerned, there is always a lot to learn. Consider Fredrick the Great who, in 1756, fearing a joint attack by major European powers including Russia, Sweden, and Hapsburg Austria etc launched a pre-emptive strike on its neighbors. According to The strategy was of immense benefit as he was able to destroy part of the hostile forces that allowed moral and tangible support when confronted by a full scale invasion. According to Adam Hart Davis (2007), the same strategy was followed by Israel in 1967 when on rumors of a joint Arab attack on her lands compelled her to make a pre emptive strike on Egypt, Syria and Jordan (P. 353). The result was that Israel doubled its land area in just six days by capturing the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank and the Golan heights. Again, what mattered was not the advanced weaponry that Israel had but the line of thought that was mutual between Fredrick the Great in 1756 and the Israeli leadership of 1967. Another example is the use of landscape and climate by the Russian Tsar Alexander in 1812 against Napoleon and by the Russian leader Joseph Stalin in 1941 against Nazi Germany. This use of the climate is yet to be seen again but, according to Adam Hart – Davis (2007), the use of the terrain and the landscape by the Viet-Cong against American forces in Vietnam and the Afghan Guerrillas against Soviet troops in Afghanistan enforces my point that tact is something which can be learned from the great Generals of the past (P. 355, 373-4). The last reason to support my thesis is that the rules of engagement have not changed as weaponry or tools have improved and not changed completely. This calls for a more proactive approach as to how we address the issue at hand, namely, whether the current military professional stand to benefit from the study of the Great generals of the past. Consider an example. The Trojan War, as depicted by Homer in the Iliad and the Odyssey, could be the first example in warfare history of deception. Whereby the Trojan horse was meant to be a gift, it turned out to be a mechanism as to how the Athenian forces enter the city. Contrast this with reports that in the run up to the 2003 Second Gulf War. According to Sifry and Cerf (2007), American intelligence agencies planted false evidence to make Saddam Hussein believe that the coalition attack would come from Turkey and not from the Southern neighboring countries of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (P. 114). This forced Saddam to place more battalions to defend the Northern front than would have been necessary. Thus, it can be argued that weaponry or tools, to a large extent have remained the same in nature but have changed in form. Guns have replaced swords but their use remains the same. Cannon guns have been replaced but their use remains the same. The Trojan horse has been replaced by false intelligence and thus the use remains the same. In the end, the point of contention is that if the tools at hand for the general have only changed in form and not in substance, there is every reason to believe that the current military professional stands to benefit a lot by studying his counterparts from centuries ago. Conclusion Thus, as can be seen, there is still a lot for the current military professional to learn from his predecessors. The reasons are that situations repeat themselves, tactfulness is an attribute that can be readily applied and does not wither with age and the use of the tools at the military disposal remains the same. It can be argued, thus, that the greatest armies of our time will not be those that have the most advanced weaponry but those with the best Generals who happen to know the history of those before them yet alike them. Adam Hart – Davis (2007). History: The Definitive Visual Guide from the Dawn of Civilization to the Present Day. London: Dorling Kindersley. Gilbert, M. (2004). The Second World War: A complete History. London: Henry Holt and Co. Sifry, M. & Cerf. C. (2007). Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. . New york: Simon & Schuster